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Difficulties Encountered in the Application of the Phenomenological Method 
in the Social Sciences 
 





While it is heartening to see that more researchers in the field of the social sciences are using 
some version of the phenomenological method, it is also disappointing to see that very often some 
of the steps employed do not follow phenomenological logic. In this paper, several dissertations 
are reviewed in order to point out some of the difficulties that are encountered in attempting to 
use some version of the phenomenological method. Difficulties encountered centred on the 






As phenomenological philosophy gets better known 
in general in contemporary society and there is 
general awareness that it has developed a method, 
more scientists interested in studying experiential 
phenomena are turning to the use of the 
phenomenological method. On the one hand, this 
awareness and usage is good, but, on the other hand, 
it often is not realized on the part of the users that a 
proper understanding of how to employ the 
phenomenological method in the social sciences is not 
something about which a consensus exists. There are 
several procedures being recommended presently, but 
not all of these are acceptable, either according to the 
criteria of phenomenological philosophy or in terms 
of sound phenomenological research strategies. In this 
article, I will examine six dissertations that claim to 
follow the phenomenological method, and I shall 
highlight some of the difficulties the scholars 
encountered and comment on whether or not the 
solutions to the difficulties are appropriate. The 
criteria to judge the solutions will be specified and 
will be based upon phenomenology and the logic of 
research, not on personal biases. 
 
I encountered this problem because of a recent 
requirement imposed upon graduate students at my 
institute. In order to help prepare them to conduct 
doctoral research in a good way, they are now 
required to write an essay critiquing another doctoral 
dissertation using the same method they intend to use. 
Since all my students employ the phenomenological 
method in their research, I have been reading many 
other dissertations that claim to have used the 
phenomenological method. I was surprised to see the 
great variations in interpretation of the method. 
Consequently, I have randomly chosen six of these 
dissertations selected by my students to comment 
upon the variations and strategies employed. Three 
are from the field of psychology and three are from 
nursing. 
 
I want to make clear that the motive for this article is 
not to fault the students, nor even their directors, but 
to try to clarify the problems encountered in this type 
of research and to attempt to resolve them in 
satisfactory ways. One of the problems is that 
consistent exposure to phenomenological thought is 
simply not easily available in the Anglo-American 
culture. Even when it is, it is usually philosophical 
phenomenology, and the issue of how to translate 
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these philosophical concepts and ideas into scientific 
guidelines is often not addressed. Moreover, doctoral 
students are dependent upon the advice of their 
directors, and with respect to concrete research 
strategies most directors in this era have been trained 
in empirical modes of thought and often had to pick 
up qualitative methods on their own. Unlike certain 
other qualitative methods, such as grounded theory or 
certain narrative strategies, the phenomenological 
method requires a background in phenomenological 
philosophy which at certain times specifies criteria 
other than empirical ones. Phenomenology is not 
against empiricism, but it is broader than empirical 
philosophy. That is because its method interrogates 
phenomena which are not reducible to facts. 
 
To argue that some variations are legitimate and 
others are not is not to assume or propose an 
orthodoxy. The phenomenological method has some 
flexible characteristics, especially when applied at the 
level of scientific analysis, but it doesn’t mean that 
every variation can be legitimated. The variations 
have to be in accord with phenomenological 
principles or sound research practices. 
 
Finally, I will only be considering those methods that 
base their legitimation in Husserl. In other words, I 
will be dealing with descriptive phenomenological 
methods rather than with interpretive ones. It would 
unduly increase the length of this article if every type 
of phenomenological method had to be considered. 
Now I will turn to the issue of types of problems 
encountered in the practice of the phenomenological 
method within the context of science. 
 
Type of Phenomenological Method to be Used 
 
It has to be borne in mind that the phenomenological 
method was first articulated by Husserl (1913/1983), 
the founder of phenomenology in the modern sense, 
and was intended to be a philosophical method. 
Unsatisfied with the progress of philosophy over the 
centuries, Husserl (1910-11/1965) wanted philosophy 
to be as rigorous as the sciences and thus he proposed 
a method for analyzing conscious phenomena. Surely, 
not all philosophies have to proclaim a method, but 
Husserl believed that, if there was going to be 
progress in philosophical knowledge, then 
methodological procedures would have to be 
followed. In brief, Husserl’s philosophical method 
(1913/1983) stated that one should (1) adopt the 
phenomenological attitude (more on this below), (2) 
encounter an instance of the phenomenon that one is 
interested in studying and then use the process of free 
imaginative variation in order to determine the 
essence of the phenomenon, and finally (3) carefully 
describe the essence that was discovered. The above 
is the articulation of Husserl’s philosophical method. 
If one applied the above method directly, without 
modification, one would be doing philosophical 
analysis. Many commentators have given variations 
of this method, and sometimes social scientists apply 
the method without modification, not realizing that 
philosophical analyses are being conducted even if 
the data seem to pertain to nursing or psychology. 
More is required to make the method scientific. For 
example, Garcia (1996) followed Spiegelberg’s 
(1960) articulation of the method, and, despite the 
fact that it was clearly within the context of 
philosophy, no modifications were introduced when 
she applied the method to nursing data. 
 
Consequently, some sense of the discipline being 
practiced has to be added to the philosophical 
procedures articulated by Husserl. We (Giorgi, 1985) 
ourselves have proposed that a disciplinary attitude be 
adopted within the context of the phenomenological 
attitude that also has to be adopted. Thus, if one is a 
nurse, then a nursing attitude should be adopted and, 
if a psychologist, then a psychological attitude is 
required, and so forth. The adoption of the 
disciplinary attitude brings the proper sensitivity to 
the analysis and provides a perspective that enables 
the data to be manageable. The data will always be 
richer than the perspective brought to it, but it is the 
latter that makes the analysis feasible. Without the 
strict application of a delineated perspective one can 
be pulled all over the lot. 
 
It also should be mentioned that some students seem 
to consider it a virtue to refer to as many 
phenomenologists as possible when discussing the 
logic and steps of the phenomenological method. 
However, at this stage of the development of the 
phenomenological method, there are as many 
differences among commentators as there are 
similarities. For example, Grant (2004), in 
legitimating her phenomenological method, refers to 
Creswell (1998), Geertz (1983), Giorgi (1985; in 
press), Husserl (1913/1962), Kvale (1996), May 
(1965), Moustakas (1994), Polkinghorne (1989), and 
Schütz (1932/1967). Yet, if one put all of these 
thinkers side by side, one would not get a harmonious 
integration. There are irreconcilable differences 
among them. Rather, the researcher has to choose one 
methodologist and stick with the logic proposed by 
the methodologist. One can certainly try to introduce 
variations into the method proposed by the chosen 
methodologist, but not primarily by quoting from a 
different methodologist proposing a different logic. 
One would have to come up with an argument that 
would be harmonious with the logic of the primary 
methodologist. 
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The Interpretation of the Phenomenological 
Reduction 
 
If one is going to use a phenomenological method that 
is based upon the thought of Husserl (1913/1983), and 
all the selected dissertations meet this criterion either 
directly or indirectly, then the phenomenological 
reduction has to be implemented. However, it seems 
that few practitioners get this part of phenomenology 
correct. 
 
Basically, to employ the phenomenological reduction 
means two things: (1) The researcher has to bracket 
personal past knowledge and all other theoretical 
knowledge not based on direct intuition, regardless of 
its source, so that full attention can be given to the 
instance of the phenomenon that is currently 
appearing to his or her consciousness; and (2) the 
researcher withholds the positing of the existence or 
reality of the object or state of affairs that he or she is 
beholding. The researcher takes the object or event to 
be something that is appearing or presenting itself to 
him or her, but does not make the claim that the 
object or event really exists in the way that it is 
appearing. It is seen to be a phenomenon. 
 
These are attitudinal perspectives invented by Husserl 
in order to make the descriptions required by 
phenomenology more rigorous. Many experiential 
errors are committed when current experiences 
provoke associations with former experiences and 
then are subsumed under the latter as identical 
whereas they may be only similar, and the differences 
could be important. Thus Husserl recommends that 
one examine the ongoing experience very carefully 
before relating it to other similar experiences or to 
relevant knowledge gained in other ways. Similarly, 
one often imagines that a situation is in fact exactly 
the way that one experienced it only to discover later 
that that was not the case. So Husserl wants to limit 
our epistemological claim to the way that an event 
was experienced rather than allow for leaping to the 
claim that the event really was the way it was 
experienced. To make the latter claim is to make an 
existential or reality affirmation rather than staying 
within the confines of experience. To limit oneself to 
experiential claims is to stay within the phenomenal 
realm. 
 
Now, as we turn to the dissertations under review, we 
find that the work of MacRenato (1995), Garcia 
(1996), and Friedeberg (2002) do not mention the 
phenomenological reduction at all, and Trumball 
(1993) and Driscoll (2004) mention only bracketing 
and do not reference the withholding of the existential 
affirmation. Grant (2004) mentions the withholding of 
existential affirmation but does not explain it, nor is it 
clear that she employed it. Sometimes the lack of 
proper application of the phenomenological reduction 
is due to the sources used, and sometimes it is due to 
how the researcher interpreted the steps of the 
phenomenological method. In either case, one cannot 
say that the phenomenological method was properly 
employed. 
 
In relation to bracketing, there is an allied procedure 
that is often used – although, of the studies under 
consideration here, only Trumball (1993) used it – 
and that is an attempt on the part of the researcher to 
list all of the assumptions he or she has with respect 
to the phenomenon being studied in order to avoid 
their having a role in the analysis. It is dubious 
whether this procedure works. I have known 
researchers who were trapped within their own 
listings rather than freed from them. But the major 
point is that the biases must be recognized in the very 
process of analysis. Reflecting upon potential biases 
before the actual analysis is no guarantee that a bias 
may not still be operating during the analysis. The 
two activities – reflecting upon one’s past experiences 
in the search for biases, and analyzing 
phenomenological data currently being experienced – 
are too different to guarantee a bias-free attitude. 
 
The Role of Imaginative Variation 
 
We mentioned above that the Husserlian 
phenomenological method required the use of 
imaginative variation in order to discover essential 
characteristics of the phenomenon being investigated. 
Of the six dissertations under review, four – 
MacRenato (1995), Garcia (1996), Friedeberg (2002), 
and Driscoll (2004) – do not mention imaginative 
variation. If this step is missing, and if the 
phenomenological reduction was not properly 
employed, then these dissertations would have to be 
considered empirical rather than phenomenological 
studies. Indeed, Friedeberg (2002, p. 31) even states 
that she is looking for criteria that would satisfy an 
“empirical scientific method”. To satisfy that criterion 
would definitely put the method employed outside the 
range of phenomenology, and perhaps that is why she 
neglects to mention the use of imaginative variation. 
Nevertheless Friedeberg (2002) contradictorily refers 
to her dissertation as a “phenomenological 
investigation”. 
 
If we turn to Trumbull (1993, p. 92), he states that 
“Phenomenological Reduction involves Bracketing 
the Phenomenon, Horizontalization and Delimiting in 
deriving textural descriptions, followed by 
Imaginative Variation” (capitals in original). 
Trumball references Husserl’s Ideas after that 
sentence (no pages given), but he cannot be right, 
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because, while Husserl does speak about 
horizontalization in other contexts, the idea of 
delimiting and textural descriptions are not part of 
Husserl’s vocabulary, and horizontalization is not 
related to bracketing in his works. Rather, it seems to 
me that Trumbull has taken some of these views from 
Keen (1975) and has attributed them to Husserl. In 
any case, there is a good bit of confusion in his 
method section, including the understanding of 
bracketing, but we only want to comment here on 
how he employed imaginative variation. 
 
Trumbull (1993, p. 98) utilized imaginative variation 
only after he went through the process of delimitation. 
Trumbull (1993, p. 96) states that delimitation means 
that he “must, from the phenomenon itself, separate 
out the central data from the peripheral”. In other 
words, Trumbull is selecting what is essential and 
separating it from what is not, but he’s doing it 
without the help of free imaginative variation. Then 
he applies imaginative variation to the delimited data. 
It seems to me that his use of imaginative variation 
comes a bit late, and it is confusing when he states 
that it is applied to the “delimited data, meaning units, 
themes and textural descriptions to determine the 
underlying structures and meanings …” (Trumbull, 
1993, p. 98). The steps of the method seem not to be 
in proper logical order. 
 
The Question of Generalization 
 
There seems to be much confusion about the 
generalizability of phenomenological data. While 
Grant (2004, p. 58) allows for generalizability, she 
also states that “It is hard to determine, however, prior 
to a phenomenological study whether its results can 
be generalized”. However, that is not true. So long as 
one can employ the eidetic reduction, with the help of 
imaginative variation, one can obtain an eidetic 
intuition into the state of affairs and describe an 
essential finding that is intrinsically general. Husserl 
makes it clear that one can do that even with a 
particular experience. I may observe a specific chair. 
But nothing prevents me from switching attitudes and 
taking a more general perspective toward the 
particular chair and seeing it as a cultural object 
designed to support the human body in the posture of 
sitting. That more general description is as true as the 
particular details of the chair that is taken as an 
example of a particular perception. There is no way to 
prevent one from assuming such a more general 
perspective. The switch results in eidetic findings 
which are intrinsically general. The understanding of 
eidetic findings seems to be problematic when 
phenomenology is applied in the social sciences. 
 
Only two other studies of the six even mentioned the 
question of generalizability, and both in a way that 
ignored the question of eidetic results. MacRenato 
(1995, p. 134) wrote: “Since the purpose of the 
phenomenological approach is to gain rich 
descriptions of individual experiences or of specific 
human phenomena, findings from such studies should 
not be considered generalizable”, and Trumbull 
(1993, p. 84) wrote:  
 
I am not interested in nomothetic knowledge 
obtained from traditional scientific methods, 
nor am I interested in an understanding gained 
from observations derived from detached, 
“objective,” measuring, testing, categorizing 
and classifying ways. I am not seeking 
knowledge of laws of generalizations, nor of 
averages. Instead, my search is for idiographic 
knowledge, or a way to understand the 
essences: What distinguishes this phenomenon 
from all others? What is its unique character? 
 
Both of these statements confuse several issues. 
MacRenato does not realize that the richness of a 
concrete description can facilitate the discovery of an 
essence with the help of free imaginative variation. If 
one does not employ the eidetic reduction and arrive 
at an essence or some other type of eidetic invariant 
concerning the concrete, detailed description of an 
experienced phenomenon by one or several 
participants, proper phenomenological procedures 
have not been followed. One could then otherwise 
merely end up with a summary that is an empirical 
generalization – and such a generalization has 
different characteristics from phenomenologically 
founded eidetic results. It is certainly acceptable for 
Trumbull to want to have nothing to do with “laws of 
generalization”, but an essence is precisely such a 
type of generalization. Husserl (1913/1983) admits 
that there can be an essence of an individual, but it is 
still a reduction of concrete data to its “essential 
characteristics”. Yet, Trumbull investigated 14 
participants and he did try to generalize the findings 
across the participants because he came up with 
composite textural and structural descriptions. 
Consequently, when Trumbull stated that he was 
interested in a “unique” phenomenon, he did not 
distinguish sufficiently what belonged to the 
phenomenon and what belonged to the individual. 
Since many individuals can experience the same 
phenomenon, albeit differently, the distinction is very 
important. A phenomenological analysis can deal 
with both issues, but they are different problems. 
 
Finally, it is amazing that the other three dissertations 
did not bring up the problem of the generalizability of 
the findings at all. Friedeberg (2002, p. 101) 
mentioned that further research might further clarify 
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some of her findings, but she never mentioned just 
what the limits were with respect to generalization. 
She did admit that she (Friedeberg, 2002, p. 45) had 
biases that she did not believe she could eliminate, 
and nor did she want to. Rather, she thought that the 
better strategy was to address them, presumably in the 
course of the research. She is free, of course, to 
choose that option, but it does remove her from a 
genuine descriptive phenomenological method, which 
she claims her dissertation to be. Neither Garcia 
(1996) nor Driscoll (2004) raised this issue, and as a 
consequence it renders the interpretation of their 
findings more ambiguous than need be. 
 
The Issue of the Verification of Findings 
 
There is not space in this article to go into the whole 
issue of validity and reliability with respect to 
phenomenological results, but I do want to respond to 
certain practices that are being performed in some 
phenomenological dissertations, as well as published 
articles (see, for example, Arminio, 2001), regarding 
alleged verification of findings. The two strategies 
involve the use of judges in some form or other, and 
the presentation of the findings to the participants for 
them to verify. From a phenomenological perspective, 
both strategies are misguided. Driscoll (2004, p. 55), 
for example, wrote that “… three colleagues were 
asked to review the exhaustive descriptions: two 
advanced practice registered nurses in psychiatry and 
a psychiatrist. They agreed with the accuracy of the 
description based on their experience of caring for 
women with bipolar II disorder”. At best, this 
procedure might result in some type of “face 
validity”, but it could not function to ascertain 
genuine validity. For example, suppose an in-depth 
analysis of the result came up with a completely new 
finding. Could the experienced nurses judge that it 
belonged to the experience of bipolar disorder based 
on their past experience with such patients? The new 
finding is justified on the basis of all of the new data 
collected, not on the past experience of experts. 
Besides, this strategy is motivated by empirical 
considerations, not phenomenological ones. 
 
However, a major step that was employed for validity 
was the use of informant or participant review of the 
results with which the researchers came up (Driscoll, 
2004; Friedeberg, 2002; Garcia, 1996; MacRenato, 
1995). This is a step advocated by Colaizzi (1978), 
and so, if a researcher adopts his method, he or she 
includes this step. What this step involves is that the 
researcher presents her findings to the participants for 
the purpose of verification, and, if the participant 
offers corrections, then, according to Colaizzi, those 
corrections must be accepted. However, there are 
several reasons why this step does not survive critical 
scrutiny. 
 
First, there are two theoretical reasons for not using 
this step. The participants describe their experiences 
from the perspective of everyday life, from the 
perspective of the natural attitude. The analysis is 
performed from the phenomenological perspective as 
well as from a disciplinary perspective (psychology, 
nursing, and so forth). The phenomenological attitude 
properly employed results in eidetic findings that can 
only be checked by phenomenological procedures. It 
cannot be assumed that the ordinary person is aware 
of those procedures, so the so-called verification by 
the participant has to remain dubious. Secondly, since 
there is a disciplinary perspective, the findings should 
be loaded with the discipline’s orientation, which 
again means that some expertise is required in order 
to understand the results. The purpose of the research 
is not to clarify the experience that the individuals 
have for their own sake, but for the sake of the 
discipline. All six dissertations claim to want to 
understand the phenomenon that is being researched, 
and the discussions all relate to the research literature 
in the discipline. The research is undertaken in order 
to understand certain disciplinary phenomena in a 
more adequate way. Whether or not the individual 
participant agrees with the findings is beside the 
point. There is a confusion here of goals: this is 
knowledge for the discipline, not for the individual 
(more on this below). Now, to avoid 
misunderstanding, it does not mean that a 
phenomenological method cannot be used to clarify 
an individual’s experience. But if so, then the 
researcher does not need multiple participants, but 
multiple instances of an experience from the same 
participant. Even then, the findings should be 
mediated by the researcher so that they can be made 
comprehensible for the participant. Also, my stance 
does not mean that findings cannot be shared with 
curious participants. They can, but not for purposes of 
verification or correction. But it can be a nice gesture, 
since participants gave of their time and energy so 
that the researcher could complete his or her project. 
 
But there is still another theoretical reason for not 
employing the step of having participants verify 
phenomenological findings. The assumption behind 
the procedure is that the experiencer is also the best 
judge of the meaning of the experience. But it is not 
at all clear that that assumption is true, as any 
experienced therapist can verify. Merleau-Ponty 
(1964, p. 54) puts it this way: “The insight into 
essences rests simply on the fact that in our 
experience we can distinguish the fact that we are 
living through something from what it is we are living 
through in this fact” (italics in original). When a 
researcher presents phenomenological findings back 
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to a participant, he or she is asking them to confirm 
what was lived through. The participant may not have 
even thought about that issue. Participants are surely 
privileged when it comes to what they experienced, 
but not necessarily concerning the meaning of their 
experience. The findings, if properly obtained, are 
concerned with meanings of experience. Again, 
Merleau-Ponty (1964, p. 65) makes a critical but 
insightful point when he writes: “Reflection on the 
meaning or essence of what we live through is neutral 
to the distinction between internal and external 
experience” (italics in original). Consequently, there 
is no privilege on the part of the experiencer, and to 
use participants as validity checks is thus not 
trustworthy. Of course, it doesn’t mean that the 
researcher is necessarily always correct, but, given the 
alleged expertise in the ways of phenomenology and 
the amount of effort that went into the analysis of the 
raw data as opposed to a simple reading of the 
findings and a non-methodical response to them, I 
would bet on the researcher. 
 
The last comment brings up a practical reason for not 
employing the procedure. One must remember that 
the application of the phenomenological method is a 
time consuming, painstaking procedure. If, at the end 
of this long process, when the final eidetic structure is 
shared with the participant, one allows a single 
reaction on his or her part to be a sufficient reason to 
change the structure, the results of phenomenological 
analysis are fragile indeed. Moreover, if such 
confidence is placed in the participant’s experience, 
then why not simply ask her what her experiences 
mean to her and simply jot them down? Why go 
through such a long procedure and possibly not get it 
right, when a simple word from the experiencer can 
presumably tell the researcher exactly what needs to 
be known? Yet Colaizzi (1978, p. 62) emphasizes that 
“Any relevant new data that emerges from these 
interviews [participants’ feedback] must be worked 
into the final product of the research” (italics in 
original). It seems to me that the reasons for not 
including this step are far more compelling than any 
possible reason for including it. 
 
Moreover, other problems can emerge. Driscoll 
(2004) included the validity step in her dissertation. 
She (Driscoll, 2004, p. 57) states: “Colaizzi’s (1978) 
seven step method for data analysis was followed 
which included returning to the participants for a 
review and validation of the final exhaustive 
description. Seven of the 11 women responded to the 
exhaustive description.” Driscoll goes on to say that, 
on the whole, the participants approved of her 
“exhaustive description”, but there were suggestions 
made to add some clarifications and Driscoll added 
them. But what about the four participants who did 
not respond? What are we to make of that fact? Could 
it be that they did not agree with the exhaustive 
description? Is that why they did not respond? Of 
course, there could be other reasons for the lack of 
response, but since this is such an important step for 
this method, how could the researcher remain content 
with less than 100% feedback? 
 
There is another variation on this “feedback by 
participants” issue and it is confounded with another 
problem: the problem of whether one concentrates on 
the phenomenon or on the individual in the research. 
But first let me address how the “feedback by 
participants” issue comes up again. Friedeberg (2002) 
decided that she wanted to study the phenomenon of 
countertransference as experienced by therapists, and 
she wanted to use a qualitative method. She states that 
she explored Giorgi’s (1985b) method, and, while she 
appreciated the rigour of the steps, she did not think 
that she could go along with the third step. Her 
reasoning was that, since psychotherapy was a 
collaborative effort, she wanted the raw data to be 
collaborative rather than simply being constituted by 
the participants, who were three practicing therapists. 
Consequently, she allowed herself to be completely 
dialogical with respect to the obtaining of the raw 
data. Nevertheless, the phenomenon she was 
interested in studying was “psychotherapists’ 
experiences moving through countertransference 
toward empathy”. Friedeberg stressed the relationship 
that is required for therapy to take place and therefore 
argued for a collaborative approach. 
 
Her justification for the collaboration is based in part 
on other situations wherein psychologists sympathetic 
to phenomenology used collaborative strategies. She 
(Friedeberg, 2002, pp. 31-32) refers to C. Fischer, 
who used collaborative strategies in a testing 
situation, and Gendlin, who also worked with 
therapeutic settings. The underlying commonality 
here is that the individual is the focus of the process 
rather than the phenomenon. The phenomenon is 
subordinated to the individual. Thus, despite what 
Friedeberg wrote – that the researcher is interested in 
the phenomenon of countertransference – the real 
focus of the study is on how two therapists (that is, 
the researcher and the participant) talk about 
countertransference’s effect on one of them. The raw 
data is no longer the experience of the participant 
with respect to countertransference but includes the 
interpretation of the researcher – a therapist’s reaction 
to how another therapist (the participant) is 
experiencing the effects of countertransference. 
Because of this interaction, the raw data is no longer 
“clean”, as would be required by rigorous research 
strategies. Friedeberg doesn’t seem to realize that, 
when an interviewer more or less effaces herself in 
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order to give room for the participant’s experience to 
emerge, the situation is still dialogic. Without the 
questions of the researcher-interviewer, the 
participant would not know what to say. But, 
whatever the case may be in therapy, in research, 
even if the situation is dialogic (and how could it not 
be?), it does not mean that the researcher gets equal 
billing with the participant.  
 
Friedeberg (2002, p. 32) admits being influenced by 
Moustakas (1994) in her design, and they both 
implicitly value the experience of the individual along 
with the phenomenon that is being researched. They 
critique Giorgi’s method on the grounds that the 
individual disappears in the application of the 
phenomenological method as he utilizes it. However, 
neither realizes that their critique confuses the goal of 
research with its method. Giorgi is a basic researcher 
who applies the method in general for uncovering 
essential characteristics of a specific phenomenon 
regardless of whom the experiencer is. The 
phenomenon is what stands out, and to have a specific 
individual’s experience submerge is part of the 
design. With this goal, the contributions of specific 
individuals are typified so that general findings can 
prevail. However, the integrity of the individual 
experience is not violated in Giorgi’s method. That is 
because the generalization happens with the 
intentional relationships with the world and others 
remaining intact. The typical findings are expressed 
structurally, not isolatedly. On the other hand, should 
one want to study an aspect of a given individual’s 
experience, one has only to change the goal of the 
research and the method is equally applicable. The 
goal of the research is not then the phenomenon as 
such, but a specific phenomenon as experienced by 
John Doe. But such a strategy does not usually 
contribute to general psychological knowledge. 
 
This is something frequently encountered when 
psychologists with therapeutic interests undertake 
research. Their therapeutic interests are often not 
sufficiently bracketed and they conflate good research 
design principles with therapeutic practices. Thus, 
because the therapeutic situation is dialogic, 
Friedeberg (2002, p. 45) believed that her research 
setting had to be dialogic in the same sense, and so 
she made her own responses part of the raw data. The 
logic is not sound. She was interviewing therapists 
about their experience of countertransference with 
their clients, and her role should simply have been to 
listen and, when necessary, to evoke deeper 
descriptions, but not to participate in the experiential 
descriptions as a psychotherapist. If her interest were 
truly in the phenomenon of countertransference, then 
the individual ways that her participants dealt with 
that phenomenon had to be typified and not 
heightened as idiosyncratic responses. Otherwise her 
data could only speak to the individual ways that her 
participants experienced countertransference and no 
generalization would be possible. One cannot follow 
therapeutic interests and research interests in the same 
study. They should be kept separate. A therapeutic 
attitude should be adopted for therapy and a research 
attitude for research, even if one is doing research on 




The review of these dissertations makes it clear that 
scientific phenomenological research has not as yet 
come of age. Unfortunately, I believe that the results 
encountered here are typical. The basic principles of 
phenomenology are often cited correctly, but they are 
not always fully understood, and nor are they always 
implemented correctly. Thus, when approaching 
social science research with phenomenological titles, 
one must be wary concerning what will be found. 
 
Given that evaluation, it is well to remind ourselves 
that the last word regarding this type of research has 
hardly been spoken. It is also good to remind 
ourselves that, when natural scientific psychology got 
started, it too groped about for a while before certain 
practices were refined and became acceptable. The 
chief drawback, as mentioned at the beginning, is the 
lack of proper exposure to sound phenomenology. It 
happens in the philosophy departments, but those 
lectures are either directed toward philosophical 
issues or are expositions of philosophical texts. That 
is all to the good, but what is also required are many 
discussions concerning how to mediate between the 
fundamental concepts of philosophical phenomen-
ology and the practices of sound scientific research. 
This mediation will not be easy to accomplish, 
because the habits of thought and practices are so 
solidly empirical among today’s social scientists that 
it may simply require a new generation with a new 
frame of mind to bring about the required 
transformations. But, while nothing should prevent us 
from continuing to try to improve the quality of 
scientific phenomenological research, that cannot take 
place unless we first acknowledge that what is being 
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